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Abstract
Financial market imperfections severely restrict currency use in international trade.
We develop a unified search-based framework with financial frictions to address the
determinants for currency choice, emphasizing the roles of trade finance and financial
market development, as well as macro, micro factors and firm-level bargaining power.
In an open economy monetary search model with financial intermediation, the usage of
a particular currency will emerge endogenously and strategic complementaries among
exporters, importers and financial intermediation reinforce the status of international
currency. With highly disaggregated data from Colombia, we provide firm-level ev-
idence that financial factors significantly affect the patterns of currency usage. We
show that exporters prefers the currency with a more developed financial market, es-
pecially for small firms in financially vulnerable sectors. In particular, a developing
country with medium-level of financial development could enhance its currency usage
by more than 10% if they further develop their financial market. Meanwhile, bad
monetary policy and low bargaining power of exporters will also hurt the popularity of
currency, although empirically firm-level bargaining power only has a secondary effect.
These results provide important policy implications for developing countries that seek
to improve the international role of its own currency but suffer from financial market
underdevelopment, unstable monetary policy and inferior bargaining position of firms,
emphasizing the role of financial market development and macroeconomic stability.
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1 Introduction
The currency chosen by exporters to set price is one of the most important and
interesting questions in international macroeconomics. Basically, an exporter can
choose its own currency (PCP), the destination country’s currency (LCP) or a third
country’s currency (VCP). This “invoicing currency” choice problem attracted sub-
stantial attention among academic researchers and policy makers. First, the currency
denomination of international trade has real effects on the macroeconomy. It will
directly affect how balance of payment and domestic prices react to exchange rate
fluctuation when price is sticky.1 Secondly, invoicing currency choice has important
policy implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy and the choice of exchange
rate regimes (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005). Thirdly, as a
starting point, the currency denomination in international trade is usually the first
stage of currency internationalization (McKinnon, 1969). What determines the cur-
rency choice? What are the roles played by financial intermediaries, or more generally
financial market? How would the financial, macro, micro and firm-level strategic fac-
tors work together to reinforce each other and what are the relative magnitude of
their effects? These are the main questions that this paper is to address.
Trade finance and financial market development have long been recognized as one
of the crucial characteristics in currency choices of international trade but formal
modeling has been illusive. On one hand, the theory that links trade finance and
financial market development to invoicing currency choice is sparse.2 As Gopinath
(2015) observed “...It is often suggested that currency invoicing choices in trade trans-
actions are related to the depth of financial markets in currencies, particularly in the
provision of trade credit...While this is plausible there is very little formal analysis
of this linkage.” On the other hand, historical experience clearly shows the essential
role played by trade finance and financial markets in currency internationalization.3
Recently, trade finance still plays an important role in facilitating international trade,
1The degree of exchange rate pass-through effects is closely linked to invoicing currency choice
as documented in Engel (2006) and Goldberg and Tille (2008).
2Previous studies in invoicing currency choices either emphasized macroeconomic factors such
as economy size and openness, or focused solely on the industrial or firm level factors. However,
the importance of trade finance and financial market development is largely left not considered or
modeled.
3US GDP surpassed Great Britain in 1870s, and U.S. share of world export surged to 22.1%
in 1913, but the international role of USD was essentially zero, while Sterling still invoiced over
60% of world trade in early 1900s (Broz, 1997). The establishment of FED is believed to speed up
the rise of USD, with its favorable policy towards developing financial market and providing trade
credit(Eichengreen, 2011).
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especially for developing countries like Colombia and China.4 The key innovation in
this paper is to explicitly consider the link between financial market efficiency and
endogenous invoicing currency choice.5
By integrating trade finance and financial intermediation to the currency choice in
international trade, our paper provides a novel, tractable, and unified framework to
study how financial, macro, micro and firm-level strategic factors jointly affect firm’s
currency choice.6 Furthermore, we discipline our theory with empirical evidence us-
ing a proprietary and rich dataset of Colombia’s trade from 2007 to 2013. With
multinomial logit model, we are able to estimate and rank the effects from various
factors in invoicing currency choice decision. Based on these rankings, we argue it
gives useful policy implications for the governments trying to promote the usage of
their own currency in international trade.
In terms of model characteristics and theoretical predictions, we develop a unified
micro-founded framework based on the open economy monetary search model (La-
gos and Wright, 2005, Zhang, 2014) to incorporate various determinants of currency
choice, especially trade finance and financial development. Goods are assumed to be
delivered one period after contract, and the lack of commitment calls for financial
intermediation (also called banker) to provide liquidity to the exporters, and bankers
would later get paid by the importers. Financial intermediation operates at a fixed
cost, and exporter receives liquidity at discount, so he would choose the currency
with a higher level of profit. Consequently, a currency is never used in international
trade if the issuing country does not have a liquid and efficient financial market. The
theory features the explicit consideration of time-to-ship friction and the essential
role played by trade finance. Strategic complementaries among exporters, importers
and bankers illustrate how financial, macro and bargaining factors reinforce status
of international currency. In this sense, our paper studies currency choices using the
New Monetarist approach as summarized in Williamson et al. (2010).
The theoretic model formulates four testable hypothesis regarding the financial,
macro, micro and firm-level strategic factors respectively. First, the currency issued
4As reported in BIS report, US$6.58 trillion of bank-intermediated trade finance was provided
during 2011, supporting around 1/3 of international trade. Higher share for emerging markets.
5Despite the relevance of trade finance and financial intermediaries in international currency
choice, theoretical work on its implications for invoicing currency choice remains sparse. See Ahn
et al. (2011), Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) for trade finance related works.
6Recently there has been a growing literature on endogenous currency choice and its linkage to
exchange rate pass-through (Devereux et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Goldberg and Tille, 2008; Gopinath
et al., 2010; Chung, 2016; Goldberg and Tille, 2016).
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by the destination country with better financial market development is more likely to
be used, especially for firms more reliant on trade finance. This prediction is novel
and has not been identified in previous literature. The second prediction is that bad
monetary policy, which gives rise to high inflation and high exchange rate volatility,
would make the currency unattractive for international trades. This is consistent
with the theoretic work in Devereux et al. (2004), Engel (2006) and the empirical
work in Wilander (2006), Goldberg and Tille (2008) and Chung (2016). The third
hypothesis is that exporters with higher bargaining power would be more likely to use
their home currency. It is consistent with the recent empirical work by Goldberg and
Tille (2016). The fourth forecast is that when we consider PCP, LCP and VCP in a
three-country model, homogeneous goods tend to rely more on the VCP, consistent
with the “coalescing effect” as firstly identified in Goldberg and Tille (2008).
Furthermore, we test our theory’s predictions using a novel and rich dataset of
the Colombia’s international trade from 2007 to 2013. Colombia is best described as
a developing country heavily relying on trade finance. The dataset covers 6.4 million
individual export transactions for more than ten thousands Colombia firms. Such
a detailed transaction-level dataset has not been used to study invoicing currency
choice before. The richness of trade information allows us to design empirical strate-
gies to better identify the effects of trade finance and financial market development,
as well as other important determinants. Specifically, in the firm-level empirical tests
we construct a new proxy for firm’s trade finance dependence based on industry code
following Manova (2013), and interact this proxy with financial market development.
In the transaction-level tests, we construct a similar proxy for each transaction’s trade
finance dependence based on transportation mode following Ahn et al. (2011), and
interact this measure with financial market development. In this way, we are able to
provide the first empirical evidence on how trade finance and financial market devel-
opment affect invoicing currency choices.
We start the empirical analysis by documenting substantial variations in invoicing
currency choice among destination countries, industries and different periods, even
though unsurprisingly the US dollar strongly dominates among the currencies. For
example, when exporting to the similar regional countries, say China, South Korea
and Japan, Colombia firms use 0.00%, 0.02% and 1.36% LCP respectively while use
8.55%, 0.03% and 0.00% PCP respectively. For different industries, currency dom-
inations are significantly different. For mineral products, 15.87% are in PCP while
in food industry the share of PCP drops to zero. From the perspective of time di-
mension, the usage of US dollar was very high and stable before 2008 but started to
declined after the financial crisis in the second half of 2008. In the meantime, share of
Euro and Colombia Peso started to picked momentum. In total, there are 24 different
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currencies that are used as invoicing currencies for Colombia firms.
Guided by our theoretical framework, a thorough econometric test is performed
on the highly disaggregated Colombia dataset.7 We find strong support for our theory
that financial factors significantly affect the patterns of currency usage. The empirical
results show that exporters tend to use the currency with a more developed and effi-
cient financial market, especially for small firms in financially vulnerable sectors, after
controlling for macro, micro, firm’s bargaining power and industry-year-geographic
fixed effects. In particular, a median developing country like Colombia or China could
enhance their home currency usage by more than 10% if they could further develop
their financial markets up to the top level as Japan. Furthermore, bad monetary
policy, such as high inflation and exchange rate volatility, would severely hurt the
usage of a currency. Specifically, one standard-deviation increase in inflation and the
coefficient of variation in FX rate will decrease the likelihood of using that currency
by 6.8% and 3.8% respectively. We also find that low bargaining power of exporters
will restrict the popularity of a currency but the effect is relatevely small. In terms of
micro factor, our empirical results confirms that homogeneous goods are more likely
than differentiated goods to be invoiced in VCP relative to PCP.
Our study has important policy implications for less developed countries that
seek to expand its currency usage in international trade but suffer from backward fi-
nancial development, volatile monetary policy, and inferior bargaining position of its
exporters. The results highlighted the importance of a deep, liquid and efficient (more
developed) financial market. Equally importantly, a stable monetary policy will also
help to significantly increase the use of one currency. In the counter-factual experi-
ment, we finds that if China further develop its economy and financial market to the
level of Japan, Chinese Yuan will be promoted by around 20% in international trades.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.1 we briefly review the
related literature. In section 2, we develop an open-economy monetary search model
featuring financial frictions. This unified framework is tractable, micro-founded and
readied to be extended to show how financial, macro, micro and strategic factors affect
the choices among PCP, LCP and VCP. In section 3, we describe the dataset, show
the substantial variations in currency choices, and present preliminary empirical evi-
dence among various key factors. A formal econometric methodology and firm-level
empirical evidence are discussed in section 4, together with a bunch of robustness
7For a long time little was known beyond several broad stylized facts based mainly on aggregate
data. Recently there are a few firm-level studies on Canadian (Goldberg and Tille, 2016) and British
(Chung, 2016), but they did not consider financial factors.
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check. The empirical results, both the firm-level and transaction-level, strongly sup-
port the main predictions of the theory. Section 5 concludes with discussions of policy
implications.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the existing theoretical studies on the endogenous in-
voicing currency choice. Our unified open-economy monetary search framework is
closely related to Zhang (2014) which itself is based on the model of Lagos and Wright
(2005) and Lester et al. (2012) in monetary economics. Zhang (2014) provides the
important insights that strategic complementarity in portfolio choices between buyer
and seller, as well as information acquisition decisions of sellers, generates multiple
equilibria with different international currency regimes. The main departure we make
is to introduce trade finance and financial intermediation.8 Monetary search models
are particularly suitable for the issue of currency choice, since they explicitly discuss
the role of fiat money and allow agents to choose different currencies rather than
make exogenous assumptions9. Moreover, the tractability of search-theoretic models
enables us to comprehensively evaluate the effect of macro, micro, strategic and fi-
nancial factors.
For empirical part, our results contribute to the firm-level analysis on invoicing
currency choice.10 Recently, improved access to custom data allows for more system-
atic analysis at firm or transaction level. For Canadian import, Goldberg and Tille
(2016) synthesized the macro, micro and strategic factors for currency choice, and
documented that larger transaction size helps promote LCP. Devereux et al. (2017)
also adopted Canadian dataset to show the non-monotone relationship between mar-
8Search theory has a long history of modeling the rise of international currency (e.g. Matsuyama
et al., 1993; Trejos et al., 1996), but suffers from the indivisibility of money and the inability to reach
equilibrium. With the breakthrough in Lagos and Wright (2005), such models are now widely applied
to provide new insight into topics of international economics (e.g. Lester et al., 2012; Geromichalos
and Simonovska, 2014; Jung and Pyun, 2016; Zhang, 2014).
9The classical New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature mostly assume PCP (e.g. Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1995). To remove this assumption, some literature, such as Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2005), Engel (2006), and Goldberg and Tille (2008), allowed exporters to choose currency and pre-
set price to hedge exchange rate risk. Fully appreciating the importance of short-term fluctuation,
we consider our model complementary to the previous study by considering other relevant factors
such as financial development.
10Empirical studies with country-level also proved fruitful in many ways, and the leading research
includes Kamps (2006), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Ito and Chinn (2014), and Ito and Kawai (2016)
The lack of heterogeneity and variation at micro level, however, limits the significance of their results
and makes us prefer firm-level analysis.
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ket share and invoicing currency choice. Our empirical methodology is most close to
Chung (2016) that employed UK data in 2011 and found that firms relying more on
foreign currency-denominated input are less likely to invoice their export by home
currency. This paper adds new firm-level evidence to the empirical literature, with
a particular focus on the trade finance and financial factors in determining invoicing
currency choices and quantify the relative economic importance of various factors.
Furthermore, while the existing empirical literature are mainly for industrial coun-
tries, firm-level analysis for developing countries is quite rare, and that distinguished
our paper from others.11
This paper is also related with a vast literature discussing the impact of financial
frictions on international trade. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) highlighted the collapse
of trade finance as an important reason for Japanese financial crisis in 1990s. Feenstra
et al. (2014) used Chinese firm data to show that exporters faced a tighter credit con-
straint than purely domestic firms. The heterogeneous-firm model in Manova (2013)
and Chaney (2016) also proved that financial frictions affected both the intensive and
extensive margin of international trade. The credit constraint in these works normally
refers to working capital loan, which is made before production and mostly in home
currency. In our model, however, the trade credit provided by bank is made after
production and could be in various currencies.
Our work complemented the relevant studies that focused on the pattern of pay-
ment method in trade finance but ignored firm’s currency choice in this process.
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) built a model of contract choice and the equilibrium is de-
termined by financial efficiency and contract environment. The empirical evidence in
Schmidt-Eisenlohr and Niepmann (2015) showed that Letter of Credit is mostly em-
ployed with intermediate contract environment and riskier destination country. Ahn
(2015) took advantage of Colombian and Chilean dataset to document the dominance
of post-shipment payment, and explained it in a model featured by account-receivable
financing. Although our model assumed trade finance by bank, the implication for
invoicing currency choice remains robust with alternative payment methods.
11The conventional wisdom in classical literature, such as Grassman (1973) and McKinnon (1969),
casually observes that developing countries’ home currency is seldom used for international trade,
because of either their small economic influence, or the large share of homogeneous goods in ex-
port. Whether this observation still holds today is open to question. For example, Reiss (2015)
convincingly showed that the main exports denominated in Brazilian real are homogeneous goods.
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2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a theory that relates invoicing currency choice to finan-
cial, macro, micro and firm-level strategic factors. We mainly follow the endogenous
choice of international currency in Zhang (2014), and add trade finance to enrich
the literature. In international trade, financial restrictions have a large impact, espe-
cially for developing countries like Colombia, so the addition of financial intermediary
is realistic and reasonable. Different from the information theory in Zhang (2014),
our model features time-to-ship friction and emphasizes financial development as an
important determinant of invoicing currency choice12. The time-to-ship friction is
both empirically relevant and theoretically important. In reality, international trade
normally takes longer time and involves larger volume than domestic trade, so par-
ticipants face more risk and uncertainty (Manova, 2013). In theory, the time-to-ship
friction has dual effects on our model structure. First, The timing mismatch between
shipment and payment, combined with the lack of commitment between exporter and
importer, necessitates the existence of financial intermediation to facilitate trade. Sec-
ond, since exporters need immediate liquidity from bankers, who would get paid by
importer only in the next period, so the payment received by exporter would be dis-
counted by nominal interest rate, therefore making a channel for monetary policy to
directly influence international trade.
Several papers already noticed this kind of financial friction and tried to incorpo-
rate it into monetary search model. For example, Wright et al. (2016) modeled dif-
ferent channels to finance trade credit, both internal and external, and had in-depth
discussion on its relationship with monetary policy and banking sector regulation.
Our paper, however, diverges from previous literature by focusing on trade finance
rather than trade credit. As discussed in Amiti and Weinstein (2011), trade credit is
more of an accounting concept, referring to the accounts receivable in balance sheet,
regardless of whether it’s domestic or international trade. Trade finance, on the other
hand, is exclusively for international trade, denoting the loans extended to exporters
so that their production cost could be covered in time. Our model is greatly simpli-
fied by focusing on trade finance by banks, exporters and importers wouldn’t worry
about default. Meanwhile, the model’s implication for international currency choice
would remain robust for other types of payment method like open account or cash in
advance.
12Here we focus on a partial equilibrium setup for exporter’s currency choice. Interested reader
could refer to Liu (2016) for the version of general equilibrium.
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2.1 Environment
The following monetary search model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and
extends the two-country model in Zhang (2014) and Liu (2016). The two-country
framework is presented first and then extended to incorporate three-country and
VCP. Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2,
each populated with a unit measure of buyer, seller, and banker, who live forever with
a discount factor of β ∈ (0, 1). Their identity is fixed over time and their respective
population in country i ∈ {1, 2} is σi, σi, and (1− 2σi). Sellers always stay at home
while buyers and bankers could go abroad. Each period is divided into three rounds
of centralized market (CM), decentralized market (DM), and financial market (FM).
For DM transaction, if buyer and seller are from different countries, we would call
them importer and exporter. There is divisible and storable fiat money circulating
in each country, and its total supply evolves according to Mˆi = (1 + µi)Mi, where
Mi is the stock of country i’s fiat money in current period, and variable with a hat is
the level in next period. The growth rate of money supply µi is under the control of
central bank. To feature scale of economy in financial sector, we assume a fixed total
cost for banking industry. To avoid indeterminacy, bankers are further assumed to
be specialized in home-currency business.13
Here we start with a brief introduction on model, and detailed formulation follows.
In DM, sellers are specialized in the production of a perishable differentiated good
q but unable to consume it, while buyers are able to consume but couldn’t produce.
The lack of commitment and double coincidence requires fiat money as medium of ex-
change. Importantly, q is delivered only at the beginning of next period. For domestic
trade, we assume it’s always settled by home currency after delivery, and there’s no
role for banker. Our model is focused on international trade, where agents from dif-
ferent countries don’t trust each other. Exporters want to get paid immediately after
shipment, but importers promise to pay only after the delivery of goods in the next
period. In this case, bankers could facilitate trade by providing financial intermedi-
ation: exporters get liquidity from banker at a discount, and importers pay bankers
later to get goods. The currency choice is made by exporters, whose profit function
depends on gains from trade, monetary policy, and financial efficiency. Goods would
be shipped afterwards.
In FM, bankers first select the location of their business based on exporter’s cur-
rency choice. If country 1 exporters choose home currency to settle international
13This assumption is strong but not unreasonable. It just implies that domestic banks are efficient
financial intermediaries in their home currency, as discussed in McKinnon (1979) and Eichengreen
(2011)
8
trade, country 1 bankers would pay a fixed total cost to setup financial industry in
country 1. On the other hand, if country 1 exporters choose foreign currency, coun-
try 2 bankers would enter the market. After the establishment of financial industry,
exporters show the proof of shipment and get liquidity from bankers at a discount.
At the beginning of next period, goods are delivered, and importers pay bankers to
get them. In the following CM, buyer, seller, and banker engage in the production
and consumption of nume´raire good X and adjust their holdings of fiat money based
on the pattern of currency usage in the last period14. This CM functions as a fric-
tionless FX market, which is certainly not without loss of generality as discussed in
Geromichalos and Jung (2017), but we hold this assumption to simplify the model
and focus on financial frictions. The model timing for international trade is depicted
in figure 1.
Figure 1: Model timing
CM
Centralized Market
DM
Decentralized Market
FM
Finanical Market
Goods arrived
Importers pay bankers
CM open
Agents adjust
currency holding
Terms of trade
determined
Exporters choose
currency
Goods shipped
Bankers choose
business location
Exporters receive
liquidity from bankers
2.2 Model Setup
Now we will begin to formalize the physical environment. For tractability, as-
sume the instantaneous utility function is UB = u(q) + U(X) − H for buyer, US =
−c(q) +U(X)−H for seller, and U I = U(X)−H for banker, where q, X, and H cap-
ture the amount of differentiated good, nume´raire good, and working hour. Although
every agent could produce nume´raire good with a linear technology of X = H, only
sellers could produce differentiated good with the cost function of c(q). We further
assume that the optimal consumption in CM is X∗, such that U ′(X∗) = 1. The
14To match the model timing, we assume nume´raire good is perished at the end of each period,
and differentiated good is perished at the beginning of each period.
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conventional assumption on function form also holds, so u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(0) =
+∞, c′(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. For notations below, i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j.
The real value of country i’s fiat money in terms of nume´raire good is φi. This model
is focused on stationary monetary equilibrium where the aggregate real balance is
constant, therefore 1 + µi =
φi
φˆi
. Central banks adjust home currency supply through
lump-sum transfer to domestic agent when CM opens.
There is separate DM in each country. Buyers could go abroad with a probability
of (1 − α) while sellers always stay at home. Buyer and seller meet pairwise and at
random, with a matching function of Ni = N(Bi, Si), where the number of successful
matching Ni is a function of buyer and seller’s number in country i’s DM. From this
matching function, the number of meeting between country i buyer and country j
seller (nij), as well as the probability for country i buyer to meet country j seller (pij)
are determined15. Banking industry is perfect competitive and specialized in home-
currency business. The total cost for country i banking industry to operate in country
j is Fij, assumed to be fixed over time. The value of Fij reflects both financial efficiency
and openness. If a country’s banking sector could operate with low cost and foreign
branching is supported or subsidized by government policy, Fij will stay at a low level.
CM is open to buyer, seller, and banker from both countries. This Walrasian
market allows agents to freely adjust their holding of currency, so it’s similar to a
frictionless foreign exchange market.16 In our model, the decision by different types
of agents is public information, which incorporates the elements of strategic comple-
mentarity. For exporter, his expectation of ultimate profit from DM trade is based
on the decision of banker and importer. For banker, his business location is based
on exporter’s currency choice, and his currency choice is linked to importer’s choice
in CM. For importer, his optimal decision is tightly related with exporter’s currency
choice. The strategic complementarity among different types of agents is depicted in
the figure 2. The decision of a certain type of agent affects other’s choice, and that
would reinforce the status of international currency.
15Here we are not explicit about the matching function, since any N(B,S) ≥ min(B,S) would
work. Another reason for ignoring the function form is that our model focused on bargaining power
rather than searching friction in exporter’s currency choice. Interested reader could refer to Liu
(2016) for the importance of searching friction on global imbalance.
16In the real world, the foreign exchange market is OTC market with bid-ask spreads, and mone-
tary search models are already widely applied in this field. See Lu (2016) for FX market in China.
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Figure 2: Strategic complementarity
Exporters
Importers Bankers
currency
choice location
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2.3 Optimal choice for agents
2.3.1 CM Value function
Agent’s CM value function differs according to his type. Buyers want to hold money
at the end of CM to buy differentiated good in the next period, therefore the CM
maximization problem for country i buyer is
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j ,H,X
U(X)−H + E[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]
s.t. φimˆ
i
i + φjmˆ
i
j +X ≤ H + φimii + φjmij + Ti
where mij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; V
B
i (·) is country i buyer’s
value function for DM trade; Ti is the lump-sum transfer from country i central bank.
Buyer’s expectation of DM value function is based on the pattern of currency usage
in the last period. With the observation that buyer’s value function is linear in his
holding of money, this value function could be simplified into
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = W
B
i (0, 0) + φim
i
i + φjm
i
j (1)
Sellers don’t have any incentive to hold money in CM since the liquidity he would
get from bank is irrelevant with his money holding. His value function is therefore
omitted. For country i banker, the CM value function is
W Ii (φizi) = max
zˆi,H,X
U(X)−H + E[V Ii (φˆizˆi)]
s.t. φizˆi +X ≤ H + φizi + Ti
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where V Ii (·) is the value function for banker in financial market, related with his
holding of home currency (zˆi). Similarly, this value function could be transformed
into
W Ii (φizi) = W
I
i (0) + φizi (2)
2.3.2 Terms of trade in DM
Buyer and seller make a proportional bargaining in DM to determine terms of
trade. Buyer’s utility maximization problem is
max
q,d(m)
{u(q)− φd(m)}
s.t. u(q)−φd(m)
φd(m)− c(q)
β
= θ
1−θ
d(m) ≤ m
where q is the amount of differentiated good; d(m) is the amount of fiat money buyers
pay; θ and (1 − θ) represent the bargaining power of buyer and seller. Since buyers
make payment only when q is delivered at the beginning of next period, seller’s cost
function is adjusted by discount factor. The solution is
d(m) =
{
m∗ if φm ≥ (1− θ)u(q∗) + θc(q∗)/β
m otherwise
where q∗ is the level of consumption that would maximize total surplus such that
βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗); m∗ is buyer’s payment when total surplus is maximized, so φm∗ =
(1 − θ)u(q∗) + θ c(q∗)
β
. It will become clear later that buyer’s holding of fiat money
would never exceed m∗, because additional money doesn’t increase his gains from
trade, but incurs a loss from inflation. Therefore, buyer’s payment to seller is
φm = (1− θ)u(q) + θc(q)
β
(3)
with q ≤ q∗, βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
2.3.3 Financial constraint and exporter’s currency choice
The time-to-ship friction imposed financial constraint on equilibrium. Without
trade finance, country i exporter’s profit in DM trade with country j importer is
simply
φim
j
i − c(qji ) (4)
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where qji is country j buyer’s purchase of differentiated good settled in country i cur-
rency.
Now with financial friction, the immediate liquidity provided by bank must be
able to cover exporter’s DM cost. Given a perfect competitive banking sector, zero
profit condition holds, so the immediate liquidity is equal to the proceedings from
importer’s future payment, net of banking sector’s fixed cost. Here we assume the
fund is equally split among exporters, whose actual profit therefore depends on the
ratio between banker’s fund available and importer’s payment in the next period.
Consider country i exporter’s profit for trade settled in his home currency. The
total fund of banking industry after CM, net of the fixed total cost, is [(1−2σi)φizii−
Fii]. Here zij is country i banker’s fund allocated to country j. From banker’s optimal
currency holding derived later, the rate of return in banking sector should be able to
compensate the loss from inflation, so that, in this special case,
Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii − 1
where Ri ≡ 1+µiβ − 1 is the nominal interest rate of country i.17 With the equations
above, it’s possible to simplify the ratio between the liquidity provided by bank and
the payment from importer
(1− 2σi)φizii − Fii
njiφim
j
i
=
(1− 2σi)φizii − Fii
(1 +Ri)[(1− 2σi)φizii] =
{
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
}(
1
1 +Ri
)
So country i exporter’s profit from international trade settled in home currency is
pii ≡
[
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +Ri
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φim
j
i − c(qji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
(5)
This profit function could be decomposed into three parts. First and foremost, fi-
nancial development is negatively related with the fixed cost in banking sector (Fii),
and positive in banker’s total funding in country i (zii). Second, the discount factor
affected by central bank’s monetary policy. Lastly, exporter’s gain from trade after
the bargaining game with importer. For trade settled in foreign currency, we further
17This nominal interest rate is derived from Fisher equation. In this model, the real interest rate
is approximated by 1/β, and inflation rate is 1 + µ. So 1 + R = (1 + µ)/β according to Fisher
equation.
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assume that exporters suffer additional loss from transaction cost (τ), such as the
costs for hedging, which is assumed to be an increasing function of importer’s real
payment (φjm
j
j), so the profit function using foreign currency becomes
pi∗i ≡
[
1− τ(φjmjj)
][
1− Fji
(1− 2σj)φjzji
](
1
1 +Rj
)
φjm
j
j − c(qjj ) (6)
With these in mind, country i sellers choose settlement currency to maximize profit.
∀i = 1, 2

autarky if max{pii, pi∗i } < 0
si = 1 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii ≥ pi∗i
si = 0 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii < pi∗i
(7)
where si is country i exporter’s currency choice, equal to 1 when his home currency
settles international trade.
2.3.4 Banker’s optimal choice in financial market
If exporters find international trade profitable and choose a certain currency for
settlement, bankers need to setup business accordingly. Since banking industry is
perfect competitive, zero profit condition implies the following optimal choice for
country i bankers.
∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j

Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1−2σi)φizii − 1 if si = 1
Ri =
nijφim
i
i
(1−2σi)φizij − 1 if sj = 0
zi = zii = zij = 0 otherwise
(8)
Here zij is the country i banker’s fund allocated to country j, and zi = zii + zij. The
first condition states that, if country i exporters choose home currency, country i
banker would setup business there and allocate zii to exporters, so that the nominal
return in banking industry is equal to the nominal interest rate, which is the marginal
cost of holding fiat money. Similarly, if foreign exporters choose country i currency,
the banker would provide liquidity with the amount of zij, also making the rate of
return equal to nominal interest rate. If country i currency remained national, i.e.
si = 0 and sj = 1, country i banker wouldn’t hold any currency, as stated in the third
condition above.
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2.3.5 Optimal choice for buyer
For buyer, the optimal holding of real balance is available after combining CM
and DM value function. For country i buyer, his DM value function is
V Bi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = β
(
pii+(1−sj)pij
)(
u(qii)−φimii
)
+βpijsj
(
u(qij)−φjmij
)
+βWBi (φˆimˆ
i
i, φˆjmˆ
i
j)
where (pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
is country i buyer’s expected surplus for DM
trade settled in country i currency, and pijsj
(
u(qij) − φjmij
)
is his expected surplus
for trade settled in country j currency.
Substitute this into the expression of buyer’s CM value function, then his maxi-
mization problem becomes
max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
(βφˆi − φi)mˆii + β
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)
θ
[
u(qˆii)−
c(qˆii)
β
]
+(βφˆj − φj)mˆij + βsjpijθ
[
u(qˆij)−
c(qˆij)
β
]}
Several conventional observation in monetary search model would also apply here.
For example, the solution for maximization problem requires βφˆi−φi < 0 andm < m∗.
The first order condition for home currency is
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij)
[
θ(u′(qii)− c′(qii)/β)
(1− θ)u′(qii) + θc′(qii)/β
]
(9)
This condition states that buyer’s marginal cost of holding money (Ri) must be
equal to the expected marginal benefit. Notice that buyer’s demand for home currency
is always positive since his meeting with domestic sellers would always use home
currency as medium of exchange. This is not true for foreign currency, which crucially
depends on foreign seller’s decision.
∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j

qij = 0 if sj = 0
Rj = pij
[
θ(u′(qij)−c′(qij)/β)
(1−θ)u′(qij)+θc′(qij)/β
]
if sj = 1
(10)
With agent’s optimal choice and money market clearing condition, it’s possible to
define a general equilibrium allowing for international currency. The formal definition
is relegated to appendix.
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2.4 Three-country model and VCP
The model could be easily extended into three-country case to account for the
emergence of international vehicle currency (IVC). Related details and equilibrium
conditions are derived in appendix. The currency choice is similar to two-country
model with the following profit function for exporters.
pikij =
(
1−τj(φkmik)
)(
1− Fkj
(1− 2σk)φkzkj
)(
1
1 +Rk
)
φkm
i
k−cj(qik), ∀i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(11)
In this profit function, pikij stands for country j seller’s profit with country i buyer
if trade is settled by country k currency, and other notations follow the two-country
model above. The determinants of currency choice still include financial development,
discount factor, and gains from trade. This profit function provides one explanation
for the wide use of USD in international trade: stable monetary policy and supreme
financial efficiency make USD attractive even for trade not involving United States.
By the same token, if the issuing country of a currency has a highly developed fi-
nancial market, the invoicing currency of its international trade would have a better
chance to deviate from VCP.
Another main finding from three-country model is that homogeneous goods tend
to rely more on VCP. This is from the observation that sellers are mainly distin-
guished by their gains from trade, i.e., the financial development and discount factor
in profit function are less relevant with seller’s nationality. For homogeneous goods
with standard exchange, sellers are very similar in bargaining power, so their choice
is focused more on the financial premium of a currency, which leads to the rise of a
single IVC to invoice international trade. Therefore, the model predicts that homo-
geneous goods use more of USD due to its financial supremacy, which is consistent
with the empirical finding in Goldberg and Tille (2008).
2.5 Currency choice determinants and testable hypotheses
Through the above discussions, we focus on partial equilibrium analysis for ex-
porter’s currency choice and summarize the theoretical results in Proposition 1-4.
For international trade settled by home currency, exporter’s profit function is
pi =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φm− c(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
(12)
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where F stands for the total fixed cost of home banking sector, (1 − 2σ)φz for the
liquidity provided by bankers, φm for importer’s real payment, and R for the nominal
interest rate of home currency, controlled by central bank through the growth rate of
money supply, R = 1+µ
β
− 1. On the other hand, if international trade is settled by
foreign currency, exporter’s profit function is
pi∗ =
(
1− τ(φ∗m∗)
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)
φ∗m∗ − c(q∗) (13)
where asterisk denotes foreign variables. Exporters choose the settlement currency
that brings him a higher level of profit. With these in mind, there are four main
determinants of currency choice.
First, a higher level of financial market development makes a currency more at-
tractive. This observation is straightforward from the profit function decreasing in
the fixed cost of banking sector (F ) and increasing in the financial market liquidity
(1− 2σ)φz.
Second, currency with lower level of inflation is preferred. This intuitive result is
also obvious from the profit function decreasing in nominal interest rate (R). Sim-
ilarly, if we consider monetary policy uncertainty, the currency with higher foreign
exchange rate volatility will be less likely to be used. In our model, the effect of mon-
etary policy works both directly and indirectly on exporter’s profit function. Directly,
nominal interest rate would affect discount rate, which arises due to time-to-ship fric-
tion and the lag between payment and shipment. Indirectly, the growth rate of money
supply and nominal interest rate would influence the currency holding by banker and
buyer, as explicitly shown in equation 8, 9, and 10.
Thirdly, the bargaining power between exporter and importer affects currency
choice. Here we take advantage of partial equilibrium analysis and propose that
exporters with higher bargaining power prefer home currency under very general
assumptions. The formal proof on the part of inflation, foreign exchange rate volatility
and bargaining power is relegated to appendix.
Fourthly, as argued in the previous subsection, the model predicts that homoge-
neous goods are more likely to use VCP. Given these results from theoretical models,
we have four testable hypotheses and would verify them with the dataset from Colom-
bia exporters in the next section.
Proposition 1: Finance The currency issued by a country with better devel-
opment in financial market is more likely to be used for international trade.
Proposition 2a: Macro (Inflation) Bad monetary policies, such as high infla-
tion and currency depreciation, and exchange rate volatility, would make the currency
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unattractive for international trade.
Proposition 2b: Macro (Foreign Exchange Rate) Macroeconomic uncertainty,
as measured by exchange rate volatility, would make the currency unattractive for
international trade.
Proposition 3: Strategic (Bargaining Power) Exporters with higher bargain-
ing power would prefer to use their home currency in trade.
Proposition 4: Micro (Goods Characteristics) Exporters with higher bar-
gaining power would prefer to use their home currency in trade.
3 Data, Facts and Determinants of Invoicing Cur-
rency Choices
In this section, we start by describing the dataset used for the empirical analysis.
First, we describe the Colombia dataset in details and show various firm-level descrip-
tive statistics. The key message is: in the Colombia dataset, there are a large number
of exporting firms that are selling to a large number of destination countries in a va-
riety of industries and products, using many invoicing currencies. Next, we demon-
strate that there are substantial variations in invoicing currency choices in Colombia
export, among destination countries and different industries. These cross-sectional
and time-series variations in invoicing currency choices are crucial for econometric
analysis in the next section. Following the descriptive statistics on invoicing currency
choices, we provide a broad preliminary assessment of the various factors behind in-
voicing currency choice for Colombia exporters, highlighting the key financial, macro,
micro and strategic forces that are emphasized in the theoretic model in previous
section. We end up this section with discussion on the advantages and limitation of
Colombia dataset. In the next section, we implement systematic econometric study
on these various factors using a multinomial logit model.
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3.1 Data Source and Descriptive Statistics
Our primary data source covers daily import transactions from the Colombian
Customs Office for the 20072013 period.18 This novel database covers 6.4 million in-
dividual export transactions for Colombia exporters, from January 2007 to December
2013. Each transaction is recorded in a custom invoice containing information on
the date, exporter name, exporter ID, country of destination, currency of invoicing,
industry and product code (up to HS10), transportation method (by sea, by air, by
railway, etc.), FOB value in US dollar, quantity, and gross weight. We complement
the export data with a detailed import data. 19
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Colombia’s Export (2013)
Number of exporters 9898
Number of HS6 digit code exported 3582
Number of destination country 137
Number of Currency 24
Number of transactions 907153
Percent of transactions shipped by sea 43.4%
Average shippment value 60327
Median shippment value 2375.2
Colombia Export Value (000s US$) 54700000
Table 1 gives a snapshot of Colombia’s exports in 2013. Other years are similar.
Colombia firms export to more than 130 countries and there are around 10000 ex-
porters. In total, 24 different currencies are used. The total transaction number is
907153, among which 43.4% were shipped by sea. There are 3582 varieties of HS6-
digit products in 2013. Overall, there are very large number of exporters are selling
a large variety of products to different countries using many invoicing currencies.
Table 9, 10 and 11 in the appendix take a further step to look at distribution over
destinations, industries and destination-industry pairs respectively. Table 9 shows per
exporter distribution of the number of HS 4/6-digit product exported, the number of
transactions, the number of destination countries, the number of currencies and total
export value. In 2013, in terms of HS 6-digit products, the median firm exports 1
product while the top one percent exporters sell 44 products. Similarly, if we focus
18The data is obtained from Datamyne, a company that specializes in documenting import and
export transactions in the Americas. For more detail please see www.datamyne.com.
19Although the import data is much richer than export, it does not have invoicing currency
information.
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Table 2: Colombia Exports Distribution across industries and regions (2007-2013)
Region share (by count) Industry share
Industry Category North America Latin America Eurozone Asia Other Count Value
Animal Products 27.15% 35.35% 14.71% 14.05% 8.74% 0.93% 1.26%
Vegetable Products 56.01% 3.43% 17.61% 3.82% 19.13% 19.52% 9.71%
Foodstuffs 17.37% 56.62% 6.30% 1.36% 18.34% 6.37% 2.99%
Mineral Products 19.34% 53.27% 6.53% 6.83% 14.03% 1.41% 57.85%
Chemicals 1.92% 85.19% 1.08% 0.36% 11.45% 18.95% 4.24%
Plastics/Rubbers 8.84% 76.63% 3.26% 0.58% 10.68% 7.74% 3.30%
Leathers/Furs/Hides 30.96% 43.20% 8.58% 6.07% 11.19% 1.58% 0.63%
Wood Products 8.53% 75.76% 2.23% 1.37% 12.11% 5.80% 1.63%
Textiles 15.46% 73.19% 3.99% 0.49% 6.86% 16.67% 3.04%
Footwear/Headgear 11.93% 76.54% 3.92% 0.16% 7.45% 0.95% 0.23%
Stone/Glass 27.53% 57.72% 3.07% 0.94% 10.75% 4.90% 5.91%
Metals 15.85% 59.51% 4.43% 9.89% 10.31% 5.10% 4.46%
Machinery/Electrical 12.95% 77.01% 2.95% 0.91% 6.17% 5.19% 2.07%
Transportation 9.17% 86.13% 1.01% 0.51% 3.18% 1.20% 1.82%
Miscellaneous 13.33% 68.30% 6.21% 2.52% 9.64% 0.63% 0.18%
Service 14.45% 70.62% 4.09% 0.47% 10.37% 3.03% 0.69%
Region total 20.75% 58.92% 6.20% 2.07% 12.06%
on destination country, the median firm exports to 1 country while the top one per-
cent exporters sell products to more than 22 countries. Most of the firms are using
one currency for trade invoicing while some of them are using more than 2 different
currencies. This skewed distribution is typical in the international trade data. Table
10 shows the per HS 4-digit product distributions of total exports, and the number of
exporters, destination countries, currencies and transactions. More than 25% of the
industries use more than 2 currencies while 10% use more than 3 currencies. Again,
these distributions are skewed, with the median number of exporters and destination
countries being much smaller. Table 11 shows distributions over exporter-HS4-digit
Industry pairs, which are particularly skewed so that the vast majority involves an
exporter selling a given product to a single country in small dollar amounts. For more
than 50% of the export-product pairs, however, the exporter sells the same HS 4-digit
product to multiple countries and in large dollar amounts. More importantly, for each
exporter-HS4 industry pair, only one single currency will be used in most of the cases.
The broad composition of exports to 16 different industries and 5 different regions
in the worlds is present in Table 2. We find that the geographical composition is
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Table 3: Invoicing currency by destination countries
Count share Value share
PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
United States 0.25% 99.73% 0.03% 0.37% 99.62% 0.00%
France 0.79% 13.52% 85.70% 0.03% 2.99% 96.97%
Spain 1.02% 12.25% 86.73% 2.30% 2.26% 95.44%
Netherlands 0.37% 6.79% 92.84% 0.05% 0.72% 99.23%
Germany 0.03% 9.27% 90.71% 0.01% 2.40% 97.58%
UK 0.03% 1.60% 98.37% 0.05% 0.23% 99.72%
Canada 0.03% 0.07% 99.90% 0.16% 0.01% 99.83%
Venezuela 0.14% 1.85% 98.01% 0.52% 2.56% 96.92%
Peru 0.19% 0.00% 99.81% 0.56% 0.01% 99.43%
Mexico 0.23% 0.24% 99.53% 1.75% 0.18% 98.07%
China 8.55% 0.00% 91.45% 0.47% 0.00% 99.53%
Korea 0.03% 0.02% 99.95% 0.00% 0.03% 99.97%
Japan 0.00% 1.36% 98.64% 0.00% 1.11% 98.89%
Australia 0.02% 0.06% 99.92% 0.04% 0.10% 99.86%
dominated by the Latin America countries, which account for 58.9% by counts. The
North America (United States and Canada) accounts for 20.75% by counts. It is
important to notice that while US is still a major trading partner of Colombia and
account for 18.1% by counts, it doesn’t play as dominant as a role in the previous
studies on Canadian data (58.9% for Canadian imports) by Goldberg and Tille (2016)
and UK data (29%) by Chung (2016). Some industries account for a large share of
Colombia exports. In terms of counts, Vegetable Products, Chemicals and Textiles
accounts for a large share of exports. In terms of value, mineral products accounts
for half of the total exports value. Given that Colombia is a developing country rich
in natural resources, this is not surprising.
3.2 Characteristics of Invoicing Currency Choices
Next we report some patterns related to currency choice for Colombia exporters.
We will discuss the cross-sectional variation of currency choices in Table 3 and 4.
Then we look at the time series variation in Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the appendix.
Table 3 displays the currency distribution (PCP, LCP, VCP) over major trade
partners. The US dollar has a dominant role in exports to Unites States. While the
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Table 4: Invoicing currency by industry
Count share Value share
PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
Animal Products 0.02% 25.67% 74.31% 0.36% 6.53% 93.11%
Vegetable Products 0.01% 52.76% 47.24% 0.04% 46.28% 53.69%
Foodstuffs 0.00% 19.82% 80.17% 0.01% 18.77% 81.22%
Mineral Products 15.87% 17.43% 66.70% 0.67% 45.74% 53.59%
Chemicals 0.06% 4.56% 95.38% 0.14% 5.95% 93.92%
Plastics/Rubbers 0.04% 11.53% 88.43% 0.01% 11.67% 88.33%
Leathers/Furs/Hides 0.10% 33.62% 66.28% 0.04% 21.53% 78.43%
Wood Products 0.03% 12.39% 87.58% 0.02% 7.48% 92.50%
Texiles 0.02% 17.25% 82.74% 0.01% 20.35% 79.63%
Footwear/Headgear 0.05% 13.54% 86.42% 0.01% 5.97% 94.02%
Stone/Glass 0.03% 29.48% 70.50% 0.00% 60.37% 39.63%
Metals 0.04% 18.92% 81.04% 0.01% 13.07% 86.91%
Machinery/Electrical 0.06% 13.76% 86.18% 0.15% 16.46% 83.39%
Transportation 0.04% 9.56% 90.40% 0.01% 7.21% 92.78%
Miscellaneous 0.51% 14.27% 85.23% 0.39% 20.08% 79.53%
Service 0.07% 16.66% 83.27% 0.23% 17.27% 82.50%
PCP and LCP are low compared to VCP, there are substantial variations. Take Euro
area for example, they have a substantial shares of LCP (which are Euro) while indi-
vidual countries has significantly different shares. France has 13.52% of transactions
are invoiced in LCP while Netherlands has only 6.79%. This variation is also obvious
when we look at other regions such as Asia. In China, when Colombia exporting firms
are dealing with the customers from China, 8.55% of the transactions are invoiced by
Colombia Peso and none of them are settled using Chinese currency. When Colombia
firms are exporting to Japan, 1.36% of the transactions are denominated in Japanese
Yen and none of them are settled in Colombia Peso. In the case of South Korea, it
is in the middle. Table 4 shows the variations in currency choices exist in industry
level. The share of PCP is relatively high (15.87%) in mineral products whereas the
share of PCP falls to almost zero in food industry.
There are also substantial variations over time as shown in Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 in
the appendix. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, the usage of US dollar is very
high and stable. During 2008, its share started to decline and the share of Euro and
Colombia Peso started to increase. This could partially reflect that during the great
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trade collapse, USD-based trade finance was disturbed and exporters in Colombia
started to look for alternative currencies for international trade. After August 2011,
the share of US dollar further decreased and other currencies’ share gained more
ground. This could potentially be due to the downgrading of US government rating
in August 2011.
3.3 Broad assessment of the currency choices of Colombia
Trade
We start a broad assessment of currency choices and show how it is related to fi-
nancial, macro, micro and strategic factors. The major financial factor we consider
is financial development. For macroeconomic factors we focus on inflation rate and
FX volatility. For microeconomic factors we focus on exporter’s firm-level bargaining
power and importing countries’ market share. All related graphs are present in the
appendix. Note that United States is not included in these graphs.
Financial Factor
For financial factors, we consider financial market development as a key measure.
The theory predicts that if the destination country has a higher level of financial
development, its currency will be more likely to be used.
Figure 7, 8 and 9 in appendix show these patterns. The countries with a higher
financial development level will be more likely to have its own currency used. At
the same time, Colombia’s Peso will be less likely to be used. The vehicle currency
will be less likely to be used if the destination country has a higher level of financial
development.
Macro Factor
Inflation and foreign exchange rate volatility are among the two most important
macro factors for invoicing currency choices. Figure 10, 11 and 12 in the appendix
show the relationship between CPI and currency choice. If the country has a higher
inflation, its currency will be less likely to be used. At the same time, the vehicle
currency will be more likely to be used. Figure 13, 14 and 15 in the appendix show the
relationship between foreign exchange volatility and currency choice. If the country
has a higher foreign exchange volatility against Colombia Peso, its currency will be
less likely to be used. At the same time, the vehicle currency will be more likely to
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Table 5: Currency Choices and Product Differentiation
Heterogeneous Goods Homogeneous Goods
VCP 73.62% 82.33%
LCP 26.06% 17.52%
PCP 0.32% 0.14%
Table 6: Invoicing Currency by Firm Size and External Finance Dependence
Firm Size (Top 10 Percentile) Firm Size (Other Percentile)
External Finance Dependence PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
Low 0.00% 12.4% 82.5% 0.00% 17.4% 87.6%
Medium 0.0% 35.7% 64.3% 0.02% 28.2% 71.7%
High 1.4% 41.4% 57.1% 0.1% 20.9% 79.0%
be used.
Micro Factor
For micro factor, we consider the differentiated goods vs homogenous goods as
categorized by Rauch (1999). Table 5 shows that homogeneous goods are more likely
to use VCP while differentiated goods use more of PCP. This stylized facts are con-
sistent with Goldberg and Tille (2008).
Strategic Factor
We also consider the strategic factor when there is bargaining between exporters
and importers. As emphasized by Goldberg and Tille (2013), the firm size is a key
measure of bargaining power. Chung (2016) use Top 10 percentile of exporter’s size
as a dummy for big size exporting firms. Table 6 shows the relationship between
currency choices, firm sizes and financial dependence. We can see that larger firms
will tend to have a lower share of VCP compared to small firms.
3.4 Advantages and limitation of Colombia Data
Through the above discussions, our dataset has four advantages when compared
with the recent firm-level/transaction-level study as in Chung (2016) and Goldberg
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and Tille (2013):
The first advantage is the diversity in trading partners and industries. Through
2007 to 2013, the total number of trading partners (destination countries) was more
than 130 for exporters. The US accounts for 18.1% of exports and the second
(Ecuador) and third (Venezuela) largest partner account for 15.3% and 13.2% re-
spectively. The share of US is less dominant than the case of Canada and UK. The
industries are also very rich, in both HS4 and HS6. So this dataset represents a small
open economy exposed to a large number of partners.
The second advantage is in terms of data quality: our detailed transaction contains
Colombia exporter/importer firm ID so we can do both firm-level and transaction-
level analysis. We could also identify importing and non-importing exporters. More
importantly, our data document a lot of detailed dimensions of each international
trade transaction, such as transportation mode which has never been used in previ-
ous study. This information can help us to proxy the dependence on trade finance
used in Ahn et al. (2011).
The third advantage is the time frame of our dataset, which includes the period
both before and after the financial crisis (thus great trade collapse and trade finance
collapse). Therefore it enables us to identify how financial market turmoil and trade
finance collapse affect currency choices. The previous studies used either a single year
such as 2011 in Chung (2016) or several years before financial crisis as in Goldberg
and Tille (2016).
The last advantage is from a developing country’s point of view. Colombia dataset
is instructive as a developing country relies heavily on trade finance. This provide
a unique opportunity to study how trade finance and financial market development
affect exporters’ currency choice. While the previous literature mostly focused on the
industrial countries’ firm-level dataset, this is the first study on a developing coun-
try more dependent on trade finance, which would affect the invoicing currency choice.
This dataset also has its own limitations. First, we do not have currency choices
information for Colombia import. Second, we do not directly have the trade finance
information such as whether the exporters get trade credit or not. In the subsequent
section, we use various measures to proxy the trade finance dependence of firms.
To summarize, we provide the descriptive statistics of Colombia export/import
dataset and currency denomination of the exports. We report substantial cross-
sectional and time series variations in invoicing currency choices. We also assess
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the pairwise link between invoicing currency choices and various drivers, including
financial, macro, micro and strategic drivers. While Colombia dataset has obvious
limitations, it provides a unique opportunity to study the invoicing currency choice
for a small open economy which heavily relies on trade finance. Next, guided by
our theory, we formally conduct an econometric exercise to study various invoicing
currency drivers.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section we use several multinomial logit models to estimate the effects of
different factors and gauge the economic significance. We first introduce the econo-
metric model specification and the construction of variables. Then we present the
main empirical results. We also perform a series of robustness checks, including the
complementary transaction-level tests.
4.1 Econometric Model and Construction of Variables
We take the entire sample of Colombia exports to all the destination countries (6.4
million transactions) and reduce it to the firm-product-destination level (0.55 million
observations). As in Chung (2016) the dimension that is eliminated is the frequency
of shipping for each exporter (at the product-destination level) within a year. We
denote the exporter by superscript i, the product (at the HS6 level) by superscript
j, and the specific destination (country) by superscript e. Furthermore we use k to
denote industry in HS4 level.
We study the exporter’s choice between local consumer’s currency (LCP), pro-
ducer’s currency (PCP) or vehicle currency (VCP). The categorical dependent vari-
able is an indicator variable Lijet taking into account all pricing strategies, specifically
a vehicle currency, or producer’s currency (Colombia Peso), or the destination cur-
rency. If using producer’s currency, we assign Lijet = 0 ; while if using destination
country’s currency, we assign Lijet = 1; if using a vehicle currency, we assign L
ije
t = 2.
As the three invoicing alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (for each
firm-product-destination observation), we can use a multinomial logit (MNL) model
to analyse the choice probability between the three options. We take PCP as the
baseline option. Thus the MNL estimations yield two sets of results: LCP versus
PCP and VCP versus PCP. Statistical significance in these estimations shows the
direction in which the independent variables shift the likelihood of LCP (VCP) away
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from the baseline option of PCP. The baseline specification is:
Li,j,et = MNL(FD
e
t , FD
e
t×TFDi,kt , F irmTop10i,k, CountrySharei,et , CPIet , FXcovet , δe, δk)
(14)
where the superscripts i, j, e, k denote firm, product, destination country and indus-
try. δe, δk denote geographic fixed effect and industry fixed effects respectively. We
add geographic fixed effect for Latin America, Euro Area, Asia, North America and
others. The industry fixed effects are set at HS4 level. The empirical analysis is
mainly focused on financial, macro and strategic factors. They require the following
key ingredients: measures of destination countries’ financial development, inflation
and FX volatility in destination’s currency and bargaining power between exporters
and importers.
The first explanatory variable FDit measures the destination country’s financial
development relative to Colombia. It is from the world bank and is calculated as the
amount of financial resources provided to private sector by financial intermediary as
a share of GDP. This measure has been used extensively in the finance and growth
literature, as well as in international trade. Financial development varies significantly
in the panel. The bottom three countries are Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Iraq,
while the top three countries are Japan, Iceland and Denmark. We expect the more
developed the country’s financial system is, the less it will use dollar for invoicing and
settlement. At the same time, its own currency will be more likely to be used.
To further identify the effect of financial development, we consider the industry’s
external dependence on finance. Specifically, we use ExtF ianj to identify which
industry is more relied on external finance (including trade finance) as in Manova
(2013), which constructed this measure based on data for all publicly listed US-based
companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files.20 External finance dependence is
the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. Most
of the external finance are from banks in a variety of ways, including short term credit
20Manova also consider asset tangibility as another measure of financial vulnerability. Asset
tangibility records the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value asset. We use
this alternative measure in the robustness check and find our results are robust.
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like letter of credit and trade credit21. We do not observe the firm-level trade finance
dependence, so we build a firm-level index based on Manova’s measure as a proxy for
firm-level trade finance dependence (TFD). It is constructed as the following:
TFDi,kt = ExtF ina
k × (−FirmiSize)
We interact External finance dependence from Manova with the negative of firm
size in terms of export value. It is plausible that when the firm size is smaller and
when it is operating in an industry which depends more on external finance, it will
be more likely to rely on trade finance. If the index TFDt is higher, it signifies more
dependence on trade finance. From the theory, we expected that if the firm is more
dependent on trade finance, and when the destnational country’s financial develop-
ment is higher, it will tend to use more VCP (LCP) compared to PCP.
For strategic factors, we construct a firm-level measure for bargaining power of
exporters. (since we do not observe the importer’s firm level information, we can
not construct a similar measure for importers.) Following (Chung, 2016) we use the
firm size in export value and focus on the top 10 percentile in HS4 industry. Denote
FirmSizeTop10 as 1 if the firm size is in the top 10 percentile and as 0 otherwise. For
the importer’s bargaining power, we use the market share of the importing country
in HS4 industry as used in Goldberg and Tille (2016) and denote as CountryShare.
We expect that if the exporting firm has more bargaining power it will be more likely
to use its own currency.
For the macroeconomic variables, we look at the inflation rate in the destination
country CPI it . It is from the world bank. Our theory predicts that currency of a
country with higher inflation is unappealing to exporters. We also look at exchange
rate volatility which might be influenced by the monetary policy in the destination
country. FXcovet is the exchange rate volatility involving the destination country’s
currency against Colombia’s Peso. Our theory, as well as the existing traditional
theory(Devereux et al. (2004), Engel (2006)), predicts a currency with more volatile
exchange rate is less likely to be chosen. We also add the real GDP per capita to
control for the size of the economy.
21As stated in Manova et al. (2015) constructing the industry measures from US data is motivated
by three considerations. First the US has one of the most advanced and sophisticated financial
systems in the world. The behavior of US firms thus plausibly approximates their optimal asset
structure and use of external finance. Second, using US as the reference country is convenient
because of limited data for many other countries, but it also ensures that the measures are not
endogenous to financial development. Finally, identification does not require that sectors have
the same financial sensitivity as US but rather that their ranking remains relatively stable across
countries.
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All the related key variables and its sources are summarized in Table 12 in the
appendix.
4.2 Main empirical findings
In table 7 and 8, we summarize the baseline multinomial logit regression with the
key explanatory variables. We hereby report the estimation results for LCP vs PCP
and VCP vs PCP respectively in table 7 and 8. Remember in Columns (1) to (6)
the estimates from MNL regressions are odd ratios rather than marginal effects and
we should avoid comparing the coefficient value directly. Therefore, the signs of the
coefficients should only be interpreted as the direction of deviation from the baseline
options. We will compute and discuss the average marginal effects (AME) in a later
section. Also notice that in Column (5) and (6) we run the same regression for all
countries and non-US countries respectively.
Column (1) and (2) in Table 7 and 8 include only financial factors. The posi-
tive and significant coefficient of FDet in LCP vs PCP (Table 7) implies that if the
destination country’s financial development is higher than Colombia, it will make
Colombia firms more likely to use the destination country’s currency. Similarly, the
negative and significant coefficient of FDet in VCP vs PCP (Table 8) implies that
if the destination country’s financial development is higher than Colombia, it will
make Colombia firms less likely to use the vehicle currency. Conversely, the lower the
destination country’s financial development, the more likely exporters will choose its
own currency. (Colombia’s financial development might be higher than destination
county) This support Proposition 1.
The interaction of FD and firm-level trade finance dependence proxy TFD fur-
ther identify the effects of financial market development on the trades that are more
likely to be dependent on trade finance. The negative and significant coefficient of
TFD in LCP vs PCP (Table 7) implies if the trades are more likely to be dependent
on trade finance it will be more likely to use Colombia’s Peso. But when it is export-
ing to a destination with higher financial market development, it will be more likely
to use destination country’s currency LCP or the vehicle currency. This shows that
trade finance and financial market development is an important channel for invoicing
currency choices as argued in our theory. In sum, it demonstrates that exporters tend
to use the currency with a more developed and efficient financial market, especially
for small firms in financially vulnerable sectors. It confirms the effects of financial
market development.
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In column (3) we add strategic factors. For the exporter’s bargaining power, we
use FirmSizeTop10 and for the importer’s bargaining power, we use CountryShare.
The negative and significant coefficient of FirmSizeTop10 implied that bigger firms
will tend to shift the currency choices away from LCP (VCP) towards PCP. This
supports the Proposition 3. In some of the specifications, import countries share has
a statistically significant impacts on currency choices but its effects are not robust.
In column (4) we further add macroeconomic factors, namely the inflation and
foreign exchange rate volatility. The estimated coefficient of CPIet is significantly
negative in table 7, which suggests that if the firm is exporting to a destination with
high inflation (bad monetary policy) they are more likely to shift from LCP to PCP.
In terms of VCP in table 8, when it is exporting to high inflation country, it tends to
use more VCP relative to PCP. This confirms the Proposition 2.
Regarding to foreign exchange rate volatility, the estimated coefficient of FXcov
is significantly negative in table 7, which suggests that if the firm is exporting to a
destination with high inflation (bad monetary policy) they are more likely to shift
from LCP to PCP. In terms of VCP in table 8, when it is exporting to high inflation
country, it tends to use more VCP relative to PCP. This confirms the Proposition 2(b).
We also control for real GDP per capita of destination country in model (5) and
(6). The effects from financial development are still statistically significant and all
the other key explanatory variables still have the expected effects.
Overall, these results strongly support the model’s predictions. For both estima-
tions, we add time fixed effects at a yearly level and industry fixed effects at the
SITC-1 digit level. We also add geographic fixed effects which represent different
continentals.
4.3 Robustness
We consider two sets of robustness tests: including other explanatory variables that
have been considered in the literature as additional controls, performing the transac-
tion level tests as did in Goldberg and Tille (2016).
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4.3.1 Additional Controls
In table 14 and 15 we check whether the main results from the baseline empirical
specification still hold when we add more control variables. These control variables
include macro, micro and strategic factors which have been considered in the previous
literature. The key conclusion from this robustness check is that the main results re-
garding to financial, macro and bargaining factors still holds. While CPI has robust
and significant effects on the LCP vs PCP, the FXcov has robust and significant
effects on the VCP vs PCP.
Macro Factors
In addition to the real GDP, we add two dummy variables to capture exchange
rate regimes. Dpeg and Epeg denote the dollar peg and euro peg respectively. This
is the variable considered in both Goldberg and Tille (2016) and Chung (2016).
The results are present in Column (1) in table 14 and 15. The exporter are more
likely to use LCP when the destination countries use exchange rate pegs. They are
less likely to use vehicle currency when the destination countries are euro peggers.
Notice that for LCP vs PCP, exchange rate regime considerations absorb most of the
effect from exchange rate volatility and make the effect from FXcov not statistically
significant. Importantly, the key explanatory variables from the baseline empirical
model still have the expected and significant results.
Micro Factors
First, we consider Rauchj to capture goods characteristics. We use Rauch (1999)
measure to the trade data. We divide the SITC4 level into three categories: reference-
priced or exchange traded, Walrasian, or differentiated goods. The first two categories
include goods that highly substitutable with each other, while differentiated products,
including the bulk of manufacturing, have more limited substitutability. This dummy
variable will take values of 1 if goods are reference-priced or Walrasian (respectively)
and zero otherwise, so that differentiated goods are the reference category. Exporters
of reference-priced and Walrasian goods are expected to place a relatively high weight
in limiting fluctuations of their price relative to that of their competitors, leading in-
voicing to coalesce around a central currency which is US dollar, as illustrated in the
model as well as in Goldberg and Tille (2008).
We also consider a firm level characteristics: some firms are importing exporters
and others are pure exporters. Chung (2016) finds that their invoicing currency
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choices are significantly different from each other. So the dummy Importing is equal
to 1 if the firm is exporting and importing at the same period of time.
The results are present in Column (2) in table 14 and 15. The exporter are more
likely to use LCP (VCP) when the goods are homogeneous goods. For the differen-
tiated goods, they are more likely to be used in PCP. For importing exporters, they
are more likely to use LCP (VCP) relative to PCP. Again, the key explanatory vari-
ables from the baseline empirical model still have the expected and significant results.
Strategic Factors
Next we consider a bunch of strategic factors that have been considered and
used before. We construct another firm-level bargaining power for the exporters
Herfindali,e that measures the degree of firm competition at the industry (HS4
code)-country level. The higher the index, the more bargaining power the firms have
in that industry and in that country. This method is used in Sokolova (2015).
We also use the absolute export value as firm’s size to supplement with the pre-
vious firm size measured with quantiles. We use the total FOB value in a year to
measure its size. This variable is considered in Goldberg and Tille (2016).
The results are present in Column (3) in table 14 and 15. Compared to the firm
size measured in Top 10 percentile, both the absolute firm size and firm’s Herfindal
index do not have a robust effect.
All Controls: All Countries and Non-US Countries
Column (5) and (6) consider all the control variables for the whole sample and
non-US destinations respectively. The main results still hold. We also could notice
that CPI has robust and significant effects on the LCP vs PCP, the FXcov has
robust and significant effects on the VCP vs PCP when we add all controls.
4.3.2 Transaction-level Tests
In this section we look at the transactional-level data and run the similar multino-
mial logit regression as in the previous section.
For each transaction, we create a trade size dummy following Chung (2016) and
Goldberg and Tille (2016). We use the Top 5th percentile by size and distinguish
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between big vs small intensive margin, denoted as tradesize.
Similar to the firm-level trade finace dependence, we use an alternative proxy for
trade finance dependence for the transaction level data. First, notice that transt is the
transportation mode for each transaction which is used to proxy how the transaction
are dependent on trade finance. We assign transt = 1 if it is shipped by sea, while
transt = 0 if use other transportation modes. This is motivated by Ahn et al. (2011)
that although we can not observe the trade finance dependence on each transaction,
the goods that are shipped by sea will need a longer time to deliver and will tends
to use more trade finance. Second, we also assume that smaller firms will tend to be
more likely to rely on trade finance. Thus, we construct the new transaction level
trade finance dependence proxy as followings:
TFDt = transt × (−FirmiSize)
We also consider a financial crisis dummy crisis which will be equal to 1 if the
transaction happen between 06/2008 and 06/2009 as used in Ahn et al. (2011). We
interaction the crisis dummy with transaction mode dummy to see the effect of great
trade finance collapse and its effects on currency choices.
The transaction-level empirical test is present in table 16 where we report three
different specifications. The model (1) consider all the main explanatory variables
plus a trade size dummy. Model (2) consider the interaction between financial devel-
opment and transaction-level trade finance dependence. Model (3) consider the crisis
dummy and test how great trade collapse affect the currency choices.
The results in model (1) shows the main results still hold in transaction level
data. We find that when the transaction size is large, it tends to shift toward PCP.
We consider the transaction-level trade finance dependence in model (2) and the re-
sults show that trades that are more dependent on trade finance will be more likely
to be used in VCP. Results in model (3) shows that during the financial crisis when
the trade finance in dollar was disrupted, the currency choice shifts away from VCP
toward PCP and LCP.
4.4 Economic Significance
As in MNL models, the coefficients can not be compared directly and we need to
calculate average marginal effects (AME). Table 17 shows the result. We calculate
the average marginal effect for the baseline model as one standard-deviation increases
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in the key independent variable. In this way we can quantify the effects of various
factors. We find that the two most important factors influencing invoicing currency
choices are monetary policy and financial development. Specifically, if there is one
standard deviation increase in inflation in destination country, it will decrease its
currency usage by more than 6.8%. On the other hand, if there is one standard
deviation increase in financial development of destination country relative to home
country, it will shift the choice probability to LCP by around 3.4%. If a country with
medium-level financial market development like Colombia or China further develop
their financial market to the top level like Japan (3 standard deviation increase),
their own currency usage in international trades will be promoted by more than 10%.
If there is a one standard deviation increase in destination country’s exchange rate
volatility, it will tend to shift the choice probability away from LCP by 3.8%. GDP
per capital also has a very significant effect: if there is one-standard deviation increase
in real GDP per capita, the destination country’s currency will be 1.9% more likely
to be used. The firm-level bargaining power has a statistically significant but smaller
effects. Take China to do some counterfactual experiment: if China further develop
its domestic financial market to the highest level and its GDP per capital further
increase to a developed country level, its currency will be promoted by around 20%.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on financial market’s influences on international currency use
in trades. We discussed currency choice at firm level. First of all, we build a unified
framework with financial frictions to address the determinants of currency choice, em-
phasizing the roles of financial market development, as well as monetary policy and
firm’s bargaining power. In an open economy monetary search model, the usage of a
particular currency will emerge endogenously and strategic complementaries among
exporters, importers and bankers reinforce the status of international currency. Sec-
ondly, with highly disaggregated data from Colombia exporters, we provide firm-level
evidence that financial factors significantly affect the patterns of currency usage. We
show that exporters tend to use the currency with a more developed and efficient
financial market, especially for small firms in financially vulnerable sectors. In par-
ticular, a median developing country could enhance its home currency usage by more
than 10% through financial market development. Furthermore, bad monetary pol-
icy and low bargaining power of exporters will severely restrict the popularity of a
currency. These results have important policy implication for currency internation-
alization in developing countries.
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Although it is the first step to add financial intermediary in the open-economy
monetary search model to study endogenous currency choices, an interesting future
work is to endogenize financial intermediary. Also, it would also be very interesting to
test the model’s predictions using China’s data and see whether our empirical results
carry over to other developing countries. Another interesting route is to implement
structural estimation on our model.
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Table 7: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (LCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LCP vs PCP All All All All All Non-US
Financial Development 5.15*** 4.86*** 3.82*** 1.94*** 1.19*** 0.47***
(0.33) (0.4) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11)
Firm TFD -4.47*** -3.83*** -5.05*** -5.16*** -3.08*
(1.28) (1.17) (1.37) (1.47) (1.80)
FD × Firm TFD 2.84*** 2.32*** 3.37*** 3.54*** -0.07
(0.92) (0.85) (1.00) (1.11) (1.60)
Firm Size Dummy -1.36*** -1.33*** -1.22*** -1.15***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.08)
Importer Country Share in HS4 3.66*** 2.16*** 1.98*** 0.05
(0.63) (0.52) (0.56) (0.35)
Inflation -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.21***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01)
Exchange Rate Volatility -74.28*** -49.2*** -8.84***
(5.09) (5.22) (1.70)
GDP per capita 0.39*** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.02)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 474,258
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of LCP versus PCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples
while Column (6) consider non-US destinations. Fixed effects: δe are destinations at geographic
level including North America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δk are industries
defined at the SITC-1-digit level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters)
and are reported in parenthesis.
*** for 1% level.
** for 5%.
* for 10%.
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Table 8: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (VCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VCP vs PCP All All All All All Non-US
Financial Development -0.81*** -0.74*** -0.81*** -0.57*** -0.73*** -0.46***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
Firm TFD -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
FD × Firm TFD 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.58***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17)
Firm Size Dummy -1.15*** -1.20*** -1.19*** -1.15***
(0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.07)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -0.81*** -1.07*** -0.2 0.50
(0.39) (0.36) (0.4) (0.31)
Inflation 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.007)
Exchange Rate Volatility 13.73*** 23.9*** 6.25***
(4.33) (4.78) (1.66)
GDP per capita -0.16*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.02)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 474,258
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of VCP versus PCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples
while Column (6) consider non-US destinations. Fixed effects: δe are destinations at geographic
level including North America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δk are industries
defined at the SITC-1-digit level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters)
and are reported in parenthesis.
*** for 1% level.
** for 5%.
* for 10%.
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Table
Table 9: Distribution over Exporters (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of HS4 exported 1 1 3 7 30 3.331
Number of HS6 exported 1 1 4 9 44 4.446
Number of Transactions 1 4 21 117 1,421 91.65
Number of Destinations 1 1 2 6 22 2.746
Number of Currency 1 1 1 1 2 1.05
Export value (thousand USD) 6 36 269,738 1,796 50,910 5,529
Table 10: Distribution over HS-4 Industry (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of Exporters 4 11 32 73 311 30.73
Number of HS6 exported 1 2 4 7 14 3.338
Number of Transactions 12 69 363 1,427 10,273 845.4
Number of Destinations 4 10 21 34 68 14.59
Number of Currency 1 1 2 3 5 1.5
Export value (thousand USD) 90 868 5,839 29,550 447,500 51,000
Table 11: Distribution over Exporter and HS-4 Industry Pairs (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of HS6 exported 1 1 1 2 5 1.335
Number of Transactions 1 2 7 28 434 27.52
Number of Destinations 1 1 2 4 15 2.076
Number of Currency 1 1 1 1 2 1.02
Export Value (thousand USD) 0.7 5.5 40 280 11,010 1,660
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Table 12: Variables and Data Source
Name Description Source
FD (financial development) Private credit over GDP
relative to Colombia level
World Bank
Inflation Import country’s YOY change of CPI IMF
FX volatility Coefficient of variation for monthly
bilateral exchange rate in a year
IMF
Real GDP Import country’s real GDP, in log World Bank
EFD
(external finance dependence)
Share of capital expenditures
not financed by cash
Manova (2013)
Firm Size FOB value of firm’s total export
in a year, in absolute value
Colombia Export Database
TFD (trade finance dependence) TFD=EFD×(-Firm size) Author’s calculation
Firm size dummy Equal to 1 if firm size is at top 10% of HS4
industry
Colombia Export Database
Country share Market share of import country in HS4 in-
dustry
Colombia Export Database
Peg Equal to 1 if import country’s currency is
pegged to USD or EUR
IMF
Homogeneous good Equal to 1 if reference-priced or has stan-
dard exchange
Rauch (1999)
Importing exporters Equal to 1 if export firm is also importing
in the same year
Colombia Export Database
Herfindal (Industry) Index for Firm share in HS4 industry
(measure competitiveness)
Colombia Export Database
Herfindal (Country) Import country share in HS4 industry
(measure competitiveness)
Colombia Export Database
Trade size dummy Equal to 1 if transaction size is at 5% of total
transaction in a year
Colombia Export Database
Transportation mode Equal to 1 if transported by sea Colombia Export Database
TFD (transaction level) TFD (transaction level)=Transportation
mode ×(-Firm size)
Author’s calculation
Crisis Equal to 1 if transaction happens between
June 2008 and June 2009
Ahn et al. (2011)
Table 13: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (VCP vs LCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCP vs LCP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Financial Development -5.96*** -4.86*** -4.73*** -2.5*** -1.99***
(0.32) (0.40) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Firm TFD 4.47*** 3.33*** 4.35*** 4.78***
(1.28) (1.12) (1.16) (1.45)
FD × Firm TFD -2.84*** -2.0** -2.8*** -3.22***
(0.92) (0.80) (0.81) (1.07)
Firm Size Dummy 0.25** 0.13 0.03
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -4.5*** -2.97*** -2.1
(0.6) (0.48) (0.46)
Inflation 0.52*** 0.39***
(0.04) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Volatility 70.25*** 67.9***
(3.2) (3.7)
GDP per capita -1.5***
(0.05)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of VCP versus LCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples
while Column (6) consider non-US destinations. Fixed effects: δe are destinations at geographic
level including North America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δk are industries
defined at the SITC-1-digit level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters)
and are reported in parenthesis.
*** for 1% level.
** for 5%.
* for 10%.
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Table 14: Robustness with additional controls (LCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LCP vs PCP Macro Micro Strategic All Controls Non-US
Financial Development 0.81*** 4.40*** 1.88*** 0.62*** 0.76***
(0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11)
FD × Firm TFD 0.26* 3.20*** 2.85* 3.67** 3.93**
(1.55) (0.78) (1.46) (1.53) (1.74)
Firm Size Dummy -0.94*** -1.67*** -1.40*** -1.20*** -1.22***
(0.42) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.40)
Inflation -0.30*** -0.04*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Volatility -7.2 -83.72*** -73.19*** -6.70 6.67
(17.2) (2.32) (2.30) (17.2) (13.8)
GDP per capita 0.6*** 1.10*** 1.09***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Dollar Peg 4.96*** 5.05*** 5.19***
(0.40) (0.30) (0.39)
Euro Peg 0.86* 0.89* 0.79*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44)
Heterogeneous vs Homogeneous goods 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Non-importing vs Importing Exporters 0.31*** 0.74*** 0.81***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.17)
Firm Herfindal Index in HS4 -0.28 0.13 0.05
(0.22) (0.25) (0.26)
Firm Size (Absolute Value) 0.65 -0.04 -0.07
(0.82) (0.06) (0.06)
Importer Country Share in HS4 2.13*** 1.33** 1.57**
(0.52) (0.60) (0.73)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of LCP versus PCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples
while Column (6) consider non-US destinations. Fixed effects: δe are destinations at geographic
level including North America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δk are industries
defined at the SITC-1-digit level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters)
and are reported in parenthesis.
*** for 1% level.
** for 5%.
* for 10%.
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Table 15: Robustness with additional controls (VCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCP vs PCP Macro Micro Strategic All Controls Non-US
Financial Development -0.83*** -0.60*** -0.62*** -0.86*** -0.82***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.14)
FD × Firm TFD 0.47** 0.53*** -0.01 0.38* 0.40**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.94) (0.22) (0.16)
Firm Size Dummy -0.96** -1.33*** -1.25*** -1.16*** -1.17***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.10)
Inflation 0.018 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.002
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Exchange Rate Volatility 29.03*** 14.80*** 14.77*** 29.5*** 26.77***
(10.07) (4.04) (4.09) (9.9) (5.8)
GDP per capita -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.31***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Dollar Peg -0.15 -0.12 0.16
(0.23) (0.24) (0.20)
Euro Peg -1.48*** -1.52*** -1.50*
(0.41) (0.41) (0.24)
Heterogeneous vs Homogeneous goods 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.37***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Non-importing vs Importing Exporters 0.33*** 0.69*** 0.76***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10)
Firm Herfindal Index in HS4 -0.11 -0.69** -0.79***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
Firm Size (Absolute Value) 0.62 0.07 0.06
(0.81) (0.06) (0.05)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -1.10*** 0.41 0.17
(0.36) (0.53) (0.46)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of VCP versus PCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples
while Column (6) consider non-US destinations. Fixed effects: δe are destinations at geographic
level including North America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δk are industries
defined at the SITC-1-digit level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters)
and are reported in parenthesis.
*** for 1% level.
** for 5%.
* for 10%.
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Table 16: Transaction Level Tests
(1) (2) (3)
Variables LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP
FD 2.8*** -1.1*** 3.4*** -0.7*** 4.1*** -0.7***
FirmSizeDummy -3.7*** -3.0*** -5.3*** -4.7*** -5.4*** -4.3***
CPI -0.69*** -0.65*** -0.24***
FXcov 23.6*** 15.3** 14.4***
Transsize -1.4** -0.5***
FD × TFD 4.5 9.4***
Transmode × Crisis -1.12* -1.06***
Observations 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 17: Average Marginal Effect (AME)
FD CPI FXcov Firm Size CountryMarketShare GDP per capita
LCP vs PCP +3.4% −6.8% −3.8% −0.1% +0.9% +1.9%
VCP vs PCP −3.5% +6.8% +3.9% −0.4% −0.9% −2.0%
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Figure
Figure 3: Share of Currency: US Dollar
Figure 4: Share of Currency: Euro
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Figure 5: Share of Currency: Colombia Peso
Figure 6: Share of Currency: Other Currencies
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Figure 7: LCP and Financial Development
Figure 8: PCP and Financial Development
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Figure 9: VCP and Financial Development
Figure 10: LCP and Inflation
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Figure 11: PCP and Inflation
Figure 12: VCP and Inflation
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Figure 13: LCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
Figure 14: PCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
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Figure 15: VCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
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A Appendix
A.1 Monetary equilibrium of international trade
A.1.1 Two-country model
Given agent’s optimal choice, money market should clear. Here we focus on mon-
etary equilibrium allowing for international trade. ∀i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j
σiφim
i
i = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
σiφim
i
i + (1− 2σi)φizij + Fij = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 0}
σjφim
j
i + (1− 2σi)φizii + Fii = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 1}
σiφim
i
i + σjφim
j
i + (1− 2σi)φi(zii + zij) + Fij + Fii = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 0}
(15)
With agent’s optimal choice and money market clearing condition, now it’s possi-
ble to define a stationary monetary equilibrium allowing the existence of international
trade.
A stationary monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade is a list of
time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}2i,j=1, banker’s holding of real bal-
ance {φizi}2i=1, and seller’s currency choice {si}2i=1 such that, given other agent’s
behavior,
1. Seller’s choice of {si}2i=1 solves 7 ;
2. Banker’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves 8;
3. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves 9 and 10 ;
4. Money market clears so that 15 holds.
A.1.2 Three-country model
Since our main interest in three-country model is to explain the rise of IVC, here
we consider a special case of hegemony in which all international trade is settled in
country 1 currency. The following equilibrium condition is in order.
For seller
pi1ij = J
1
j φ1m
i
1 − c(qi1) > 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j (16)
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Here Jmn ≡ (1 − Fmn(1−2σm)φmzmn )(1 + Rm)−1 is the financial premium for country n
seller to choose country m currency. The seller’s equilibrium conditions state that
international trade should be profitable for all exporters if they choose country 1
currency.
For banker
1 +R1 =
(n12 + n13)φ1m
1
1 + (n21 + n23)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1
(1− 2σ1)φ1z1 (17)
Here z1 ≡ z11 + z12 + z13 is the total liquidity held by country 1 banker.
For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3)
(18)
Money market
φ1(σ1m
1
1 + σ2m
2
1 + σ3m
3
1) + (1− 2σ1)φ1z1 + F11 + F12 + F13 = φ1M1
σ2φ2m
2
2 = φ2M2
σ3φ3m
3
3 = φ3M3
(19)
Similar to the two-country model above, the definition of monetary equilibrium
condition is the following.
A stationary monetary equilibrium in three-country model with country 1 currency
as the single IVC is a list of time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}3i,j=1,
banker’s holding of real balance {φizi}3i=1, and all exporter’s choosing country 1 cur-
rency such that, given other agent’s behavior,
1. Seller’s profit level satisfies 16
2. Banker’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves 17
3. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves 18
4. Money market clears so that 19 holds.
The incumbency advantage applies here: as long as individual sellers enjoy positive
profit from international trade, they have no incentive to deviate from the existing
equilibrium of single international currency.
56
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
A.2.1 Inflation and Currency Depreciation
Proposition 2.1 High inflation and currency depreciation would lower the interna-
tional use of currency.
Notice that inflation level is tightly linked with nominal exchange rate in search
model. If Law of One Price (LOP) holds for nume´raire good, the determinant equation
for exchange rate is
et = φj,t/φi,t =
1 + µi,t
1 + µj,t
where et is the nominal exchange rate of currency i against currency j at time t, and
the last equation holds if two countries had identical money growth rate in the last
period. Obviously, a high level of inflation caused by rapid growth rate of money
supply would also lead to currency depreciation.
From the FOC of buyer, high inflation and currency depreciation reduces his
holding of real balance. Recall that, for country i buyer’s holding of home currency,
his FOC is the following.
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij) θ(u
′ − c′/β)
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β
Given that buyer’s liquidity premium is decreasing in trade volume, an increase of
nominal interest rate from high inflation would increase the marginal cost of using
money, thus lowering buyer’s holding of real balance.
On the part of bankers, if country i exporters choose home currency, the FOC for
country i banker is the following.
1 +Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii
Higher level of nominal interest rate would therefore decrease the currency holding
by both buyer and banker in this case.
On the part of sellers, the profit function for country i exporters to choose home
currency is the following.
pii =
(
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
)(
1
1 +Ri
)
φim
j
i − c(qji )
High inflation would directly reduce exporter’s profit through discount factor. It also
has the indirect effect in lowering the currency holding by both buyer and banker,
further decreasing exporter’s incentive to choose this currency. In sum, high inflation
and currency depreciation would lower the international use of currency.
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A.2.2 Monetary Policy Volatility
Proposition 2.2 If the gross nominal interest rate follows a log-normal distribution,
the increase of monetary policy uncertainty would lower the international use of cur-
rency.
Proof
We introduce the uncertainty of monetary policy by assuming the gross nominal
interest rate follows a log-normal distribution, i.e., ln(1 + Ri,t) ∼ N (xi, σ2i ), where
i ∈ {1, 2} stands for the issuing country of currency and t indicates period. If we
further assume the law of one price holds for nume´raire good and monetary policy in
two countries is identical in the last period, the nominal exchange rate would then
follow a log-normal distribution.
et ≡ φ2,t
φ1,t
=
1 + µ1,t
1 + µ2,t
=
1 +R1,t
1 +R2,t
⇒ ln et = ln(1 +R1,t)− ln(1 +R2,t)⇒
ln et ∼ N (x1 − x2, σ21 + σ22)
The impact of uncertainty on buyer could be derived from his first order condition on
currency holding. First consider country i buyer’s optimal holding of home currency.
E(Ri,t) = (pii + (1− sj)pij) θ(u
′ − c′/β)
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
Given the log-normal distribution of gross nominal interest rate, buyer’s expectation
would be related with volatility, i.e., E(Ri,t) = exp(xi+σ2i /2)−1. Therefore, a rise of
monetary policy volatility would also increase buyer’s expectation of nominal interest
rate, which is also his cost of holding money. After some transformation, we rewrite
the FOC as
A
[
exp(xi + σ
2
i /2)− 1
]
= G(q) ≡ u
′ − c′/β
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β (20)
where A ≡ [(pii + (1− sj)pij)θ]−1. The volatility of monetary policy would decrease
trade volume and buyer’s currency holding as long as G(q) is a decreasing function,
i.e. G′(q) < 0. Given the assumption on function form such that u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ <
0, c′′ > 0, it’s easy to show that
G′(q) =
1
β
[
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β]−2(u′′c′ − u′c′′) < 0 (21)
The procedure and result are similar for country i buyer’s holding of foreign currency.
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For bankers, his optimal currency holding is linked with buyer’s decision through
FOC. For example, in the case of PCP, banker’s optimal choice is given by the fol-
lowing condition.
E(1 +Ri,t) =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii ⇒ exp(xi + σ
2
i /2) =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii
If both buyers and bankers perceived a higher level of monetary policy uncertainty,
LHS of the above equation would increase. Given the results on buyer’s optimal
choice, his currency holding would decrease corresponding to the rising uncertainty.
Consequently, banker’s currency holding would decrease by a larger degree. Therefore,
banker’s response to volatility is in the same direction as buyer’s.
Lastly, seller’s profit from international trade is given by
pii ≡
[
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +Ri
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φim
j
i − c(qji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
The drop of other agent’s currency holding would lower exporter’s profit ( ∂pii
∂φizii
>
0, ∂pii
∂φim
j
i
> 0), thus reducing his incentive to use this currency. In sum, under general
assumptions on function form, the increase of monetary policy uncertainty, such as
inflation fluctuation and exchange rate volatility, would reduce the international use
of a currency.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Here we prove the relationship between exporter’s bargaining power and his cur-
rency choice. As shown previously, exporter’s profit function is the following if trade
is settled by his home currency.
pi =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
](
1
1 +R
)
φm− c(q)
In contrast, if exporter settles international trade with foreign currency, he would
suffer additional loss τ from cross-border transaction, which is assumed to be an
increasing function of the real payment amount, i.e. τ = τ(φm), ∂τ
∂(φm)
> 0. His
profit therefore becomes
pi∗ =
(
1− τ(φ∗m∗)
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)
φ∗m∗ − c(q∗)
where superscript of asterisk denotes foreign variable. Here we focus on partial equi-
librium analysis, so that production level q and variables in financial market such as
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F, φz, and R are fixed from the perspective of exporter. This means exporter’s bar-
gaining power would affect real payment amount (φm) directly through bargaining
and cross-border transaction cost (τ(φm)) indirectly.
Proposition 3.1 In partial equilibrium, exporters with higher bargaining power pre-
fer to use home currency if transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount, i.e.
∂(1−τ)
∂(φm)
φm
1−τ < −1.
Proof Recall the following equation from the proportional bargaining game between
exporter and importer
φm− c(q)/β = (1− θ)[u(q)− c(q)/β]
Keep q fixed and take differentiation with respect to exporter’s bargaining power
(1− θ).
∂(φm)
∂(1− θ) ∣∣q=q¯ = u(q)− c(q)/β > 0 (22)
This intuitive result means importer’s real payment is increasing in exporter’s bar-
gaining power. Given that trade settled with home currency doesn’t have transaction
cost, so we have in a partial equilibrium
∂pi
∂(1− θ)∣∣q=q¯ =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
](
1
1 +R
)
∂(φm)
∂(1− θ) > 0 (23)
with the obvious interpretation that exporters with high bargaining power would gain
more profit if the trade is settled by home currency. For trade settled with foreign
currency, however, transaction cost would make the analysis complicated. Again take
differentiation of exporter’s profit with respect to his bargaining power
∂pi∗
∂(1− θ)∣∣q=q¯ =
(
1−τ
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)[
∂(φ∗m∗)
∂(1− θ)
][
1+
∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ
]
(24)
Given that ∂(φ
∗m∗)
∂(1−θ) > 0 in partial equilibrium, exporters with high bargaining power
might experience profit decrease if transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount,
i.e. [
1 +
∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ
]
< 0⇒ ∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ < −1⇒
∂pi∗
∂(1− θ) ∣∣q=q¯ < 0 (25)
In summary, for exporters with high bargaining power, they always enjoy better profit
if trade is settled by home currency, but they might experience profit loss if trade is
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settled by foreign currency and transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount,
and this would lead to exporters more likely to choose home currency.
A.4 Complementary material
Table 18 shows the time series of different currency choice. Before the financial
crisis, 63.1 % of the transactions are invoiced in vehicle currency (mainly are US
dollars). After the financial crisis, the share of VCP declined and then bump up after
2010. Although PCP is small in proportion, it is increasing in the sample years.
Table 19 reveal the currency denomination of exports for all industries. We also
Table 18: Currency of invoicing in Colombia exports (percent %)
VCP PCP LCP
2007 63.127 0.008 36.865
2008 60.969 0.319 38.713
2009 58.803 0.309 40.888
2010 56.073 0.362 43.565
2011 60.491 0.449 39.060
2012 62.447 0.503 37.050
2013 67.128 0.610 32.262
observe a significant variation in invoicing currency across industries. The use of
LCP is very low in Machinery industry and relatively hight in food industry.
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Table 19: Currency of invoicing by industry (percent %)
SITC VCP PCP LCP
0: Food and live animals 46.628 0.756 52.616
1: Beverages and tobacco 97.004 0.000 2.996
2: Crude materials 66.829 0.002 33.169
3: Mineral fuels 96.893 0.578 2.529
4: Animals and veg.oils 84.470 0.025 15.505
5: Chemicals 91.178 0.016 8.807
6: Manufactured goods 67.431 0.032 32.537
7: Machinery 100.000 0.000 0.000
8: Miscellaneous 80.845 0.107 19.048
9: Unclassified 90.917 0.097 8.986
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